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Going Against the Current: How Aereo’s Online Streaming Left Copyright Laws
Adrift
By: Vani Parti
Part I: Introduction
More than five million U.S. homes today have “Zero-TV.” Residents of those
homes no longer watch traditional television offered by cable or satellite providers, but
instead stream videos online through the Internet.1 According to Nielsen’s 2013 Cross
Platform Report, almost half of Americans under the age of thirty-five live in Zero-TV
homes—evidencing an important change in the delivery of media.2 Over the last several
years, the shift towards dropping cable plans in favor of à la carte online streaming
services has been attributed to viewers’ concerns about the high costs of cable television
and disinterest in cable bundling.3 The rapid and broad expansion of the Internet TV has
raised significant issues, which the legal system has attempted to solve through piecemeal
decisions. One specific problem, addressed by the United States Supreme Court, is how
the public performance right and the Transmit Clause of the Copyright Act apply to new
emerging technologies.
In 2012, Chet Kanojia, with a team of engineers, lawyers, marketers and even an
Olympic medalist launched a digital start-up, Aereo, transforming the way people watch
1
Zero-TV Doesn’t Mean Zero Video, NIELSEN, (Nov. 9, 2014, 10:04 AM)
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2013/zero-tv-doesnt-mean-zero-video.html.
2
A Look Across Media: The Cross-Platform Report Q3 2013, NIELSEN, (Nov. 9, 2014, 10:14 AM)
http://www.nielsen.com/content/corporate/tw/en/insights/reports/2013/a-look-across-media-the-crossplatform-report-q3-2013.html.

3
Id.

television.4 This technology captured broadcasters’ TV signals using thousands of tiny
remote antennas and made them available in the cloud5

for consumers to watch

television anywhere on any Internet-connected device, and most importantly without
paying an expensive cable bill. Aereo’s technology focused on the inherent right of any
viewer to receive free over-the-air broadcasts by attaching an antenna to a TV and
scanning for channels. The team, however, deliberately designed Aereo to fall squarely
within a legal loophole that circumvents copyright laws. This loophole resulted from the
current Copyright Act and a 2008 ruling by the Second Circuit.
In June 2014, in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States triggered
Aereo’s shutdown because even though its crafty workaround would have been arguably
lawful, the petitioners, Broadcasters, would lose billions in retransmissions fees from
cable companies if Aereo was allowed to exploit a legal loophole.
Although the United States Supreme Court effectively ended Aereo, Broadcasters’
business model is in danger because Aereo users showed their willingness to forego cable
and satellite for a small amount of money.

Thus the question remains—does the

Copyright Act confer a monopoly on Broadcasters that stunts budding technologies like
Aereo, or do the goals of copyright warrant a different result?

4
David Carr, Aereo Case Will Shape TV’s Future, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Apr. 20, 2014)
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/business/media/aereo-case-will-shape-tvs-future.html.

5
The cloud is defined as a communications network or a datacenter full of
servers connected to the Internet, which allows remote data access and storage. See
PCMAG DIGITAL GROUP, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/39847/cloud (last
visited Jan. 1, 2015).

This Note addresses the current effort to solve the Transmit Clause problem:
misinterpretation and misapplication of the 1976 Copyright Act to today’s technology,
such as Internet Television.

Part II considers the origins and the evolution of the

Copyright Act of 1976, the subsequent development of the Transmit Clause, and the
Court’s latest effort to resolve the statutory interpretation problems encountered with the
Transmit Clause in ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. Part III suggests that Congress should amend
the Copyright Act in view of technological, regulatory, and political perspectives. Part IV
proposes a new licensing scheme and device-shifting exception for Congress to adopt in
lieu of a new Copyright Act that would resolve the disparities in copyright law by
favoring societal demands for current technology.
This Note concludes that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Transmit
Clause in Aereo unfairly discriminates against other uses of copyrighted works,
particularly Internet TV, endangers the development of cloud computing technologies,
and threatens to substantially limit the emergence of similar advanced technology
available to the public at a cheaper cost.
Part II: Overview
A. Legislative History and Statutory Background
Rapid technological change is the fundamental force behind the development of
modern copyright law. The earliest copyright laws were a reaction to the economic and
cultural conditions caused by the Fifteenth Century technology of printing with movable
type in Europe.6 When the United States adopted copyright laws, the Framers of the

6
See generally CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW (9th ed. 2013).

Constitution recognized the need to reward “authors” and “maximize the welfare of
society as a whole” through the economic incentive of granting a monopoly right for a
limited time.7 Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution states that Congress
shall have the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”8
The scope of copyright has greatly expanded over the past three centuries. Today,
the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”) grants six exclusive rights to copyright holders. 9
Section 106 of the 1976 Act provides copyright owners the exclusive right “to do or to
authorize” reproduction, distribution, adaptation, performance, display, and digital
performance.10 Copyright owners can protect their rights against direct infringement by
showing prima facie copyright ownership and an unauthorized exercise of one or more of
their exclusive rights.11 Similarly, copyright holders can enforce their rights against

7
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810; see generally CRAIG ALLEN NARD ET
AL., THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 367 (3d ed. 2011) (detailing the history of
copyright law and the Copyright Act).
8
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9
See generally Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541
(codified in various sections at 17 U.S.C.).
10
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2014).
11
Fox TV Stations v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1142
(C.D. Cal. 2012).

indirect infringement under secondary liability theories, including contributory and
vicarious infringement.12
The Act was in part a reaction to the absolute freedom enjoyed by cable systems
under judicial constructions of the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”). For example, in
the 1950s, the Cable television industry placed “community antennas” on top of
mountains and transmitted local broadcast signals to subscribers using coaxial cables.13
At the time, this service was one of a kind and provided signals where hilly terrains or
rural lifestyles made receiving broadcast signals difficult.14 Given that this practice
increased viewership, Broadcasters were satisfied and recouped revenues primarily
through advertising.15 However, copyright owners became dissatisfied with this service
because cable imported distant signals and aired copyrighted content without paying
appropriate licensing fees.16

This practice was particularly problematic because

copyright owners did not receive any compensation for the increased viewership of their

12
Indirect Infringement, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCHOOL, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/indirect_infringement (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
13
Fred H. Cate, Cable Television and the Compulsory Copyright License, 42 FED.
COMM. L.J. 191, 193 (1990).
14
See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 391–92
(1968).
15
Cate, supra note 13, at 238.
16
Id.

content; copyright owners also lost money because more houses switched from local
broadcasters, the only companies paying for the copyright licenses, to cable.17
Unsatisfied copyright holders began voicing their concerns. Yet, the United States
Supreme Court held no copyright liability for cable retransmissions of commercial
television broadcasts to subscribers in two decisions: Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc.,18 and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System.19

In

Fortnightly, the Court held that the cable company did not infringe the plaintiff’s
performance right because community antenna television (“CATV”) systems did nothing
more than “enhance the viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s signals” and
therefore passive reception and retransmission did not infringe upon the copyright.20 Six
years later, in Teleprompter, the Court reaffirmed Fortnightly by holding that CATV
systems reception and retransmission even from distant or secondary markets, did not
constitute a performance under the 1909 Act because CATV passively rechanneled
already-released material.21 As a result of these decisions, under the 1909 Act, cable

17
Id.
18
392 U.S. 390 (1968).
19
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
20
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399.
21
Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 410.

television operators were free from copyright liability—this severely affected the market
structure of television broadcasting and copyright licensing.22
Since the 1909 Act failed to minimize cable’s impact on copyright holders, the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) became concerned about the unfair and
uncompensated use of copyrights and the harm to local broadcasters.23 Consequently,
the FCC proposed regulations that required cable companies to obtain retransmission
consent for content that distant broadcasting stations transmitted.24 This effectively
stunted growth in the cable industry as no broadcasting station gave consent because it
would require fee sharing with copyright owners.25
Congress further delayed the pronouncement of a new copyright act because of
various pressures from the cable industry, the broadcasters, and the copyright owners.26
By the early 1970s, no one was satisfied with the excessive and unworkable
regulations.27 In 1976, Congress stepped in and passed the Act, which represents the

22
2-8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.18(E).
23
Cate, supra note 13, at 195–196.
24
In the Matter of Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Between Television
Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 650 (1979).
25
Id. at 651.
26
H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5703 [hereinafter cited as “House Copyright Report”].
27
Leslie Swackhamer, Cable-Copyright: The Corruption of Consensus, 6
COMM/ENT L.J. 283, 288 (1983).

cable industry’s compromise with the FCC to accept less restrictive regulations in
exchange for partial copyright liability.28 The Act primarily required cable companies to
specify that cable retransmission is a public performance subject to full copyright
liability.29 After passing the Act, Congress found it impractical and unduly burdensome
for cable companies to negotiate ad hoc copyright licenses; thus, Congress established a
compulsory copyright license system for cable.30 In providing this compulsory licensing
system to the cable industry, Congress subsidized the cable industry by recognizing the
public demand for cable and its potential benefits. This allowed the nascent cable
industry to survive beyond copyright law.
To understand how copyright law almost eliminated the cable industry, it is
important to look at the language provided in the Act. The performance right under the
Act departs from prior law because Section 101 defines the right to “perform the . . .
work publicly” as showing a motion picture or other audiovisual work’s images or
making its sounds audible “by means of any device or process” at a place open to the
public.31
Since the advancement of digital transmissions, Congress revised the Act several
times to reflect the applicability to cable systems. First, relating to television

28
See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 165–68 (1972).
29
Cate, supra note 13, at 202.
30
Id.
31
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).

programming, Congress defined the word “perform” to mean any provider “showing an
image in any sequence” as a performance.32

Then, Congress clarified the term

“publicly” in two clauses. The first clause covers performances in public places, while
the second, the “Transmit Clause” covers transmission of performances either (1) to
public places or (2) “to the public.”33 The Transmit Clause has been under fire for a lack
of clarity ever since Congress wrote it.34 The Transmit Clause states that performing a
work publicly includes:
[T]o transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the
work to a place specified by clause (1) or the public, by means of any
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving
the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same or different times.35
The legislative history is instructive in understanding this Clause; it explains that public
performance includes not only an initial rendition or a showing, but also any further act
that transmits any rendition of the work to the public.36 Thus, a singer is performing
when he or she sings a song, a cable television system is performing when it retransmits a
broadcast to its subscribers, and an individual is performing whenever he or she turns on

32
Id.
33
See generally, John Kheit, Public Performance Copyrights: A Guide To Public
Place Analysis, 26 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1999).
34
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 468 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).
36
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976).

a television receiving signals.37 Although all of these acts are considered performances, a
performance alone is not actionable under the Act. For infringement to occur, one must
perform in a public place or to the public.
Congress’ purpose behind enacting the Transmit Clause was to make the activities
of cable companies outside the scope of copyright. But, to protect innovation and the
public, and help cable companies avoid unequal negotiations with copyright holders,
Congress simultaneously adopted Section 111.38 Section 111 of the Act grants eligible
cable systems a compulsory license in exchange for copyright royalty payments for the
use of distant network transmissions.39 Although Section 111 defines a cable system
broadly enough to include retransmission carriers, Congress limits the compulsory
license only to cable systems.40 Because of the compulsory licensing and technological
advancements, the cable industry has evolved into more than just a method to aid
broadcast reception in rural areas—it is now a viable communications medium.41

37
Id.
38
Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., 777 F.2d 393,
396 (8th Cir. 1985).
39
Local signals need not be paid for, because their retransmission does not
damage the copyright holder. House Report, supra note 26, at 90, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5704.
40
M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.18[B], at 8-196 to 8-197 (1982)(stating intent of
Congress, to provide for liability for the retransmission of a copyrighted work); 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)-(d)
(Supp. V. 1981).

41
Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 278, 312
(2004); see Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47

B. Courts Defining the Transmit Clause
While Congress enacted the Act during a time of analog technology. Since then,
courts have addressed the numerous advances in technologies.42 In 1983, the Supreme
Court upheld the use of Betamax recorders, an early version of the VCR, to allow
television viewers to time-shift and record programs to view later.43 The Court did not
find the Copyright Act to prohibit television viewers from time-shifting content, nor did it
find anything that would prohibit the sale of time-shifting devices because of fair use.44
Section 107 of the Act, fair use, excepts time-shifting technology because of its
“substantial non-infringing uses.”45 The four-factor fair use test establishes that if an
individual user can establish a fair use defense, then her conduct cannot base secondary
infringement on facilitating that use for a manufacturer.46

U.S.C. 521(a)(2)-(5) (2000) (detailing the increase in cable viewership and noting that
“the cable television industry has become a dominant nationwide video medium”).
42
See, e.g., Mitchell Zimmerman & Chad Woodford, Cartoon Network v.
Cablevision--Buffer Reproductions Are Not Infringing Copies, Holds Second Circuit In
“Remote” DVR Case, 13 No. 8 CYBERSPACE LAW. 9 (2008) (summarizing the court's
reasoning to uphold the DVR after courts upheld a traditional VCR).
43
See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
44
Id. at 448.
45
Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
46
Id.

In 2008, the Second Circuit analyzed the Transmit Clause in Cartoon Network LP,
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (“Cablevision”)47 and explained that a performance is
“public” only when the audience receiving the transmission is not an individual, but
multiple members of the public.48 The court upheld cloud-based RS-DVRs where each
individual subscriber created a unique copy or recording that constituted a private
performance because Cablevision was not sharing the sole original copy publically by
definition.49

Another Second Circuit court decision discussing the legality of

Cablevision’s operations further clarified, “if 10,000 Cablevision customers wished to
record the Super Bowl, Cablevision would create 10,000 copies of the broadcast, one for
each customer.”50 Thus, Cablevision recognized that the Transmit Clause renders legally
irrelevant the location of customers during a performance.51
To determine who or what constitutes as “the public” under the Transmit Clause,
the court focused on the transmission and its potential audience, not the original telecast,
because the potential audience for every copyrighted work is the public.52 The court then

47
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121
(2d Cir. 2008).
48
Id. at 140.
49
Id.
50
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 686 (2d Cir. 2013).
51
Id. at 687.
52
Id.

interpreted the law to not aggregate multiple transmissions of the same underlying work
if each transmission was made to an individual not the “public” because aggregating all
performances together would render the “to the public” language in the Transmit Clause
moot.53

This interpretation of the Transmit Clause has caused various companies,

including Aereo, FilmOn LLP, and ivi, Inc. to design inventions according to the
Cablevision decision’s requirements.54
C. Internet TV Woes
Although online services like Hulu and Netflix originally provided only
previously-aired content, the online streaming industry has since changed.55 Today,
Netflix and Amazon produce their own original series and provide quality original
content.56 Netflix’s Chief Content Officer, Ted Sarandos explained that developing its
own programming allows Netflix to avoid huge marketing costs.57 Unlike serialized
dramas on broadcast TV, which require constant advertising, the original content strategy

53
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135-37.
54
See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498(2014); Fox TV Stations, Inc. v.
FilmOn X LLC, 968 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2013); WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d
275 (2d Cir. 2012).
55
See generally, Eric Sherman, 3 Ways Streaming Video Will Change the TV
Industry, CBS MONEY WATCH (Mar. 31, 2011, 7:13 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/3-ways-streaming-video-will-change-the-tv-industry.
56
Alex Ben Block, Netflix’s Ted Sarandos Explains Original Content Strategy,
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, (Apr. 7, 2012, 11:26 AM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/netflix-ted-sarandos-original-content-309275.
57
Id.

requires a one-time investment to draw users instead of weekly marketing.58
Consequently, Netflix has more money to spend on buying more content and making
premium content available for streaming.59 Other online content providers such as
Amazon, HBOGo, and more recently Yahoo! are following suit. Changes to content
production and marketing are creating competitive alternative programming to the
conventional TV outlet.60
With these changes, more than sixty years after the advent of cable, the fledgling
Internet TV industry—in a similar position to the cable industry in 1976—demands a
rewrite to the copyright laws for much of the same reasons as when cable caused the
passage of the Act.
Aereo is at the center of this debate.61 Unlike Netflix and Hulu, Aereo allows its
users to watch and record live broadcast television over the Internet and store up to
twenty hours of recorded content on cloud servers.62 Aereo’s system allows subscribers

58
Id.
59
Id.; Eric Deggans, Netflix Snaps Up TV Shows Rejected By Networks, NPR
(Mar. 6, 2015, 5:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/06/391149256/netflix-snaps-up-tvshows-rejected-by-networks; Netflix is not only investing money in rescuing shows that
have been on broadcast networks and cable such as Arrested Development and The
Killing, but Netflix is also releasing a show like Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt, which
was originally made for NBC. Id.
60
Id.
61
See AEREO, www.aereo.com (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
62
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d at 681.

direct control over a single personal antenna available from thousands of dime-sized
antennas that are dedicated to capturing over-the-air broadcasts.63 A brief delay in the
“watch” function ensures that the television program is not actually transmitted live.64
This delay is important because it allows Aereo to be within the judicial interpretation of
time-shifting technologies.65
Upon user request, Aereo sends the end-user a unique copy of the designated
program to view on any Internet-connected device.66

By assigning each user an

individual antenna, Aereo repurposes an old technology to avoid retransmission liability
by transmitting a series of private, unique performances.67 The individual antennas create
individual copies of each program and the private copy is only available to the particular
subscriber who selected the broadcast.68 Aereo functions as a combination of “a standard
TV antenna, a DVR, and a Slingbox-like device.”69

63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Timeshift is considered fair use. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
66
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d at 682.
67
See Adrianne Jeffries, Who’s Afraid of a Little Live TV? Why Streaming Service
Aereo Scares the Broadcast Industry, VERGE, (Nov. 13, 2014, 9:50 AM),
http://www.theverge.com/ 2012/11/13/3628402/aereo-streaming-live-tv-broadcasters.
68
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d at 682–83.
69

Broadcasters are dissatisfied with this invention because Aereo is able to exploit
their content without paying licensing fees.70 Furthermore, compared to the average cost
of basic cable at eighty-six dollars per month, Aereo offers over-the-air broadcasts to
consumers for just eight dollars per month.71
As with cable, Betamax, VCRs, and DVRs, Broadcasters sued Aereo for
copyright infringement.72 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York found that Cablevision controlled and that the broadcasters “failed to
demonstrate [that] they are likely to succeed in establishing that Aereo’s system results in
a public performance.”73
The Court of Appeals relied on Cablevision to establish “four guideposts” to
interpret the Transmit Clause and determine that Aereo did not publically perform.74

Id. at 682; “Slingbox is a hardware device that transmits signals from a cable or
satellite television connection to a personal computer over the Internet. The device, which
is manufactured and distributed by Sling Media, is intended for TV placeshifting with
individual computers.” available at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Slingbox.
70
See Associated Press, Fox Exec: “We Can't Sit Idly by and Let [Aereo] Steal
Our Signal’, ENT. WKLY. (Nov. 9, 2014, 9:23 AM),
http://insidetv.ew.com/2013/04/09/fox-exec-we-cant-sit-idly-by-and-let-aereo-steal-oursignal (describing how broadcast networks have threatened to take their networks off-theair and make them subscription only).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
74
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d at 689.

First, the Transmit Clause considers the potential audience by asking whether the
transmission is “capable of being received by the public; the transmission is not a public
performance if an individual user views it.”75 Second, the Transmit Clause does not
aggregate the individual performance with the original performance, which means that it
does not matter if the public is capable of receiving the original work; only the audience
for the individual transmission matters.76

Third, if a single copy generates a

transmission for multiple users, then the transmissions are public performances even if
only one individual receives it.77 Fourth, “any factor that limits the potential audience of
a transmission is relevant” to the Transmit Clause analysis.78
Alternatively, the Central District of California District Court interpreted the
Transmit Clause by focusing on the commercial nature of the transaction to determine if
the transmission infringed the performance right.79 For example, a district court in
California granted a preliminary injunction against a DVD rental company that streamed
movies online because the enterprise was commercial in nature and unlike Cablevision

75
Id. (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135).
76
Id. (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135-38).
77
Id. (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 137-38).
78
Id. (quoting Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 137).
79
Fox TV Stations v. BarryDriller Content Sys., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal.
2012).

where an individual copy for each individual user existed; here, a single DVD was used
for multiple users.80
In 2012, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California
also rejected Cablevision’s reasoning and enjoined Aereokiller, a similar system to Aereo,
because it was a commercial enterprise and its operations required royalty payments.81
On the other hand, California case law suggests that a court must interpret any
transmission as open to the public if the transmission is of a commercial copyrighted
work that was initially open to the public.82
More recently, however, the Central District of California District Court refused
to extend Aereo to Dish Network’s technology and affirmed the denial of Fox
Broadcasting’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief against Dish Network’s online
streaming services such as Dish Anywhere and Hopper Transfers because Fox did not
suffer any irreparable harm.83 Dish Network argued that the Aereo decision carved out
exceptions for subscribers sending content they already owned to a different device.84

80
Warner Bros. Entm’t v. WTV Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (C.D. Cal.
2011). But cf. BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (9th Circuit also upheld denial of
preliminary injunction against Dish networks in a suit brought by Fox, on the basis that
even though US had decided Aereo, Fox failed to show irreparable harm if Preliminary
Injunction not granted).
81
BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1145.
82
On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790
(N.D. Cal. 1991).
83
BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
84

D. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.
To resolve this circuit split, on June 25, 2014, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc..85 The
Court restricted their inquiry to two parts: “does Aereo ‘perform’ at all? And … if so,
does Aereo do so ‘publicly’?”86
The Court stated that the Act’s language alone does not indicate when an entity
performs or transmits and when it merely supplies the equipment for another to
perform.87 However, the Court concluded that when the language is read together with
the Act’s purpose, “[a]n entity that engages in activities like Aereo’s performs.”88
To understand the Act’s purpose, the Court turned to the Act’s legislative history
and stated that Congress enacted the Act to overrule Fortnightly and Teleprompter.89

Gina M. McCreadie and Troy K. Liberman, Ninth Circuit refuses to extend
Aereo to Dish Network’s technology, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ALERT: NIXON
PEABODY LLP (July 15, 2014),
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/170210_Intellectual_Property_Alert_15JULY2014.p
df.
85
134 S. Ct. 2498.
86
ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504 (2014); The Court remanded on
all other issues. Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89

The Court also asserted that the Act adopted the Transmit Clause and Section 111 because
Congress intended to bring cable systems within the scope of the Copyright Act.90
Consequently, the Court concluded that because “Aereo’s activities are substantially
similar to those of the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach,”
technological differences were not enough to overlook Congress’s purpose, which was
meant to target companies like Aereo.
Considering whether Aereo performed publically, under the Transmit Clause, the
Court noted that the technological differences of Aereo’s system did not distinguish it
from cable systems, which perform publically according to Congress’ regulatory
objectives.91 Further interpreting the language of the Transmit Clause, the Court posited
that “[t]he fact that a singular noun (‘a performance’) follows the words ‘to transmit’”
does not mean that an entity is not liable when it transmits a performance through several
transmissions of the same work instead of one transmission.92 Thus, an entity publically
performs when it communicates a performance to people, “regardless of the number of
discrete communications it makes.”93

Id.
90
Id. at 2506.
91
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
92
Id. at 2499.
93
Id.

Additionally, the Court found that because the Act applies to transmissions “by
means of any device or process,” user-specific copies are a means of transmission.94
The Court adopted this rationale because of Congress’s limited understanding of
“devices” at the time of writing the Act. In 1976, devices that could transmit audiovisual
content included television sets and movie projectors. Although Congress included “any
device” thwarting future inventions from transmitting, in 1976, Congress had not
envisioned the boom of the digital era and consumer dependence on digital devices.
Finally, the Court limited its holding by reasoning that Aereo’s performance does not
determine the performance of other providers in a different context.95
Dissenting, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito, concluded
that Aereo did not perform at all. Justice Scalia criticized the majority for concluding a
performance by adopting a “looks-like-cable-TV” standard, which is not found in the
Transmit Clause.96
In a section aptly titled “Guilt by Resemblance,” Justice Scalia discussed what he
called majority’s “trio of defects” in reasoning.97

First, the dissent noted that the

majority’s interpretation of Congress’s purpose is based on a faulty method of analyzing
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select portions of the legislative history.98 Second, the dissent distinguished CATV
systems which “captured the full range of broadcast signals,” from Aereo’s system that
“transmits only specific programs selected by the user, at specific times selected by the
user.”99 The dissent found this to be significant because, in 1974, cable systems selected
specific programs to import and were not merely passive carriers.100 Lastly, the dissent
rebuked the majority for replacing the bright-line volitional conduct test to determine
direct liability of copyright infringement with a “looks-like-cable-TV” test.101 In doing
so, the majority also conflated direct infringement and secondary infringement.102
The networks like ABC, NBC, CBS, in their complaint stated that Aereo directly
infringed, but to make a claim for direct infringement, the significant inquiry is who is
performing.103 To find a defendant directly liable, a volitional act that violates the Act is
necessary.104 The dissent bolstered this proposition by stating that the Act “defines

98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 2516.
102
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2515. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103
Id.
104
Id.

‘perform’ in active, affirmative terms.”105 Thus, to find Aero directly liable, Aereo must
be the one performing. However, since Aereo remains inert until Aereo’s “subscribers
log in, select a channel, push the ‘watch’ button”, Aereo does not perform; the users
directly perform.106
Justice Scalia analogized Aereo to “a copy shop that provides its patrons with a
library card,” because Aereo does nothing except respond to the customer’s activities.107
Similarly, a copy shop’s culpability can only be that of secondary infringement because
the customer who chose the content and activated the copy function would be directly
liable.108 Unlike video-on-demand services that actively select and arrange the content,
Aereo simply allots an antenna to an individual user, and the user chooses and selects
from any freely available content.109
Consequently, Justice Scalia found that the majority distorted the Copyright Act to
reach their outcome.110 Justice Scalia also correctly pointed out that the Court was
opening the door to multiple litigation quibbles about which technologies would fall
within or outside the statute because of their adoption of the vague “looks-like-cable-TV”
105
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106
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standard.111 To conclude, Justice Scalia commented, “It is not the role of the Court to
identify and plug loopholes. It is the role of good lawyers to identify and exploit them,
and the role of Congress to eliminate them if it wishes.”112
Part III: Reasons for Congress to Amend the Copyright Act
Allowing companies to design technologies that comply with copyright laws is
precisely what Congress intended the existing laws to do. Our legal system should not
punish those who deliberately follow the rule of law and rely on the law’s predictability.
Aereo did just that. Instead, Congress, not the courts, should reexamine the law against
the new technology and write laws that would facilitate a different result.
A. Regulatory Reasons
1. No Predictability in the Law/Statutory Interpretation Inconsistency
Since the enactment of the Transmit Clause (the “Clause”), various court opinions
have turned on how to interpret the language in the Clause. While the Supreme Court in
Aereo applied a “looks-like-cable-TV” test, other courts have adopted different methods
to interpret the Clause.113 This interpretation problem is causing a failure of our legal
system’s values that stress the importance of predictability because fairness and equity
require consistent results in similar cases and circumstances.114
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The lack of clarity in the language of the Clause is evident from the five different
interpretations it has sprouted in three courts: 1) the Supreme Court majority’s decision in
Aereo; 2) the Aereo dissenting opinion; 3) the Second Circuit’s interpretation; 4) Judge
Chin’s opinion in dissent; and 5) the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation.115 The Court of
Appeals for Aereo and Cablevision focus on the term “performance” when interpreting
the phrase “capable of receiving the performance or display.”116 Judge Chin in his
dissent emphasizes that the correct interpretation of the Clause rests on the interpretation
of the language “any device or process.”117 Although the Supreme Court decision
should have resulted in a final interpretative method for lower courts to follow, the
uncertainty and conflicting method suggested by the Supreme Court is only going to
create further confusion.118 Further, the Supreme Court’s suggested standard would
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hinder developing technologies because of a lack of reliability in the law. Even the
Court, during oral arguments seemed confused as to what standard would apply.119
Justice Sotomayor agreed that Aereo fit the definition of a cable company, but she further
questioned that if the Court found Aereo to be a cable company would they be allowed to
get compulsory licensing that other cable companies receive.120 However, nothing in the
Supreme Court’s opinion says that Aereo should be entitled to compulsory licensing.121
2. Effect on Emerging Technology

The standard adopted in Aereo also implies that no “clear” standard exists for
determining when a technology company, rather than the user, has engaged in volitional
conduct. As Justice Scalia correctly noted the majority opinion’s improvised standard
will “sow confusion for years to come,” because this unclear method would affect most
cloud-computing companies negatively even though the Supreme Court suggests
otherwise.122
The plain meaning adoption of Aereo’s decision, which finds Aereo to be an
integrated system that is not in line with copyright, would affect cloud-computing
companies that are similar to Aereo because they use shared pools of configurable
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computer resources. Like all cloud-based platforms, Aereo allows some of the same
physical equipment to be used independently by multiple consumers, which decreases
waste and cost. Consumers increasingly rely on remote equipment to store and access
online files, including personal copies of copyrighted content like songs and videos.
The Court implied that the relevant “performance” for the purposes of the
Transmit Clause is the original broadcast, rather than the individual transmission.123 This
interpretation aggregates all individual transmissions of a program by individual
consumers using Aereo.124 Justice Scalia in his dissent noted that if the Court extended
this aggregation, then it would turn all cloud storage providers into infringers because
such aggregation blatantly disregards the premise that consumers have a long-established
right to make personal copies for free. He also pointed out that the Court failed to
account for the “salient differences” between cable and Aereo.125 This is an important
distinction because Cable companies act deliberately and forward a full range of
broadcast signals to all subscribers at all times, whereas Aereo transmits “specific
programs selected by the user, at specific times selected by the user.”126 Yet again, the
Court’s interpretation jeopardizes cloud technologies that are more like Aereo’s passive
business model than cable.
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Justice Scalia also suggests that this meaning actively imperils the use of cloud
technologies to store and access copyrighted content because whenever two users of a
cloud-based drive separately play a song stored on the server, the provider would be
liable for publicly performing by transmitting the same underlying performance to
multiple members of the public even though these are separate copies.127 According to
him, this makeshift rule will take “decades, to determine which automated systems now
in existence are governed by the traditional volitional-conduct test and which get the
Aereo treatment.”128 Following, the legality of cloud-storage technology will remain in
flux because of the “the imprecision of its result-driven rule”.129
Although the Court did imply that their decision was narrow and confined to
“looks-like-cable-TV” type inventions, it did not explain why the performances enabled
by cloud storage services are “private” under this reading. Hence, the Court’s solution is
unworkable to cloud storage services. By way of example, if a consumer watches a video
uploaded on Google Drive, while any other consumer is watching the same video on her
own personal account on Google Drive, then the Court would find Google Drive liable
for a public performance. This decision places a heavy burden on storage companies to
avoid liability because these companies would have to monitor the content stored on its
system for its use.
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The Aereo decision provides no guidance regarding how cloud computing
companies should configure their equipment to avoid being directly liable for their
consumer’s use of that equipment.130

Cloud technologies generate “enormous

efficiencies through economies of scale, allowing users to benefit from reduced cost and
increased reliability,” and “provide[ ] substantial data portability, permitting a user access
to his or her data via any device with an Internet connection.”131 Cloud technologies are
also widespread and quickly growing; annual spending has surpassed $50 billion,
delivering savings to U.S. businesses projected to reach $625 billion over the next five
years.132 Although this decision vows not to directly impact cloud companies, it
nevertheless causes confusion as to the future interpretations of the Transmit Clause as
applicable cloud technology.
B. Political Reasons
1. Consumer Choice
Copyright law is not only concerned with protecting rights but also with providing
maximum benefits for the public.133 Today’s consumer choices reflect the demand for
services such as Aereo. Increasingly, consumers are moving towards Internet television
simply because most cable owners do not have the time to watch every channel that
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comes with their bundle nor the money to pay the expensive bill.134

Internet TV

supplemented with services like Netflix and Hulu provide a convenient patchwork of
services in a cost-effective manner.135
Technology industry analyst Jeff Kagan says that “[f]or years, we’ve been
complaining about the uncontrollable rising prices of cable television.” According to
HBO Network CEO Jeff Bewkes, “[t]here’s a lot of people out there that want to drop
multichannel TV, and just have a Netflix or an HBO . . . .”136 This shift to Internet
television reflects the consumer choice; it shows that they want to pay only for the few
channels that they want to watch and are likely to watch.137
Additionally, Internet television provides a service that is missing in all other
applications (“apps”) – the ability to watch live sports.138 Brian Proffitt, a technology
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expert specializing in enterprise, cloud and big data, suggests that “sports are perhaps the
biggest reason (on the content side) holding people back from switching away from pay
TV.”139

The ability to watch broadcasted games that are not covered by cable’s

expensive media packages is a perk for Internet TV consumers.
Proffitt also states that “[i]n the transition from land lines to cell phones, it was
the E911 service that made the decision for us: making sure emergency services knew
exactly where we were calling from was very important.” Today, the ability for Internet
television to provide secure news in times of national disaster might play an equivalent
role in the transition. The Emergency Alert System serves as our current national public
warning system.

It allows broadcast stations, cable systems, satellite radio, Digital

Broadcast Satellite (“DBS”) systems, participating satellite companies, and other service
providers to receive and transmit presidential, state and local alerts, and emergency
information directly to the public.140 However, a few national disasters have shown that
reliance on cable during national emergencies is now misplaced because physical repairs
to affected cables take longer than restoring Internet connectivity.141 In the U.S., Internet-
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based services reflect greater resilience than any other telecommunications method.142
For example, during Hurricane Katrina and subsequent flooding in Louisiana in 2005,
landlines, telephone circuits, the State Police radio system, and cellular phone networks
all failed.143 One local Internet Service Provider was able to maintain some Voice over
Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone service even during the disaster, and the State Police used
this to communicate over their intranet.144 Thus, the availability of over the air broadcast
waves and the Internet’s robustness provides that Internet TV will always be an
accessible medium in times of emergency because the loss of routing is an easier fix than
the ubiquitous disruptions caused by physical cable damage.
C. Technological Reasons
1. Transmit Clause Does Not Apply To Current State Of Technology
In 1968, cable television’s innovative technology warranted a change in the
Copyright Act. Justice Abe Fortas in his dissenting opinion in Fortnightly summarized
the problem, he stated, “the novelty of the use, incident to the novelty of the new
technology, results in a baffling problem. Applying the normal jurisprudential tools – the
words of the Act, legislative history, and precedent – to the facts of the case is like trying
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to repair a television set with a mallet.” 145 Once again, the same problem with the new
technology of Internet TV is at the forefront with Congress’s inability to keep copyright
legislation up to date in accordance with the speed at which technology has advanced. In
1968, the word “performance” in the Copyright Act of 1909 did not reflect the
development of CATV.146 Congress wrote the 1909 Act “in a different day, for different
factual situations.”147 Arguably, Congress did not write the 1976 Act keeping the
technology of today in mind.
The 1976 Act “took over two decades to negotiate, and was drafted to address
analog issues and to bring the United States into better harmony with international
standards, namely the Berne Convention.”148 Although, the Act was an accomplishment
of its time, today the lack of contemplation for digital transmissions is evident: until
1998, online service providers were liable under copyright law for the actions of their
subscribers that they had no control over.149 To remedy that situation, Congress adopted
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a piecemeal Internet overlay – the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which
is still an imperfect standard because it was adopted long before cloud storage,
automobile software, and personal tablets.150

Part IV: Proposed Solution
With new technology emerging and judicial attempts struggling to plug the
loopholes within the current Act, it is time for Congress to write a new Copyright Act.
For our society, the Internet has been the most revolutionizing invention and it deserves
its technological finesse and capabilities be accounted for in the law.151 While the entire
Copyright Act requires a revision to incorporate the Internet, to address Internet TV in
particular, Congress must specifically rewrite the public performance right.

The

ambiguities in the definition of “public,” “performance,” and “transmit” shows the need
for clarification in the law. This feat could take years to come as a political gridlock
hinders any congressional action.
1.

Short Term Solution: Compulsory License

For now, a makeshift legislative remedy is required. Similar to cable, Internet
television requires a licensing provision to protect innovations and ward off marketplace
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failure.152

With the Aereo Court holding Aereo-like technologies liable under the

Transmit Clause because they look like cable companies, Congress should provide a
similar subsidy to online television as it once provided for cable in the 1950s. Although
the Supreme Court applied a “looks-like-cable-TV” standard for Aereo, nothing in the
Court’s decision suggests that it should get a compulsory licensing that cable companies
receive. A compulsory licensing scheme would allow compensation for broadcasters and
serve consumer interest in receiving a la carte content.
In 2008, the Copyright Office looked into a compulsory licensing scheme for
online broadcast videos.153 Mary Beth Peters, the former Copyright Register, found the
ability for companies to sidestep private negotiations troublesome.154 However, she did
note the success of Section 111 as an efficient mechanism to allow the cable industry to
thrive.155 Moreover, the principal finding in the report suggested that systems that use
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Internet Protocol to deliver videos are substantially similar to cable systems that already
use Section 111, and should be subject to the same statutory licensing paradigm. 156
This note does not suggest that Section 111 should be adopted for Internet
broadcasting. The model is ill-suited for digital broadcasting because it does not consider
the complexities of newer technology and is designed for controlling cable providers.
Congress should adopt a new statutory licensing scheme for the Internet TV industry.
The Internet’s unique capabilities require licenses specified to protect the growth of
future innovation, shield lower entry barriers for smaller innovators while adequately
compensating copyright authors.157 If innovations like Aereo are held liable, then the
public loses content even though it fits into the statutory copyright scheme. Because
Aereo looks and acts like cable, but is not considered cable, it does not reap the rewards
as other cable providers, yet is regulated like cable without a statutory license.
Under Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., Broadcasters are not
allowed to claim copyright royalties when a consumer accesses and makes a personal
copy of the local broadcast because a personal copy is a quintessential fair use.158
Further, Congress exempted cable systems from any obligation to compensate copyright
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holders when they retransmitted broadcast programming already available to cable
subscribers over the air. Thus, Congress recognized that retransmission of programming
within the original broadcast market “does not injure the copyright owner,” who
“contracts with the [broadcaster] on the basis of his programming reaching [its audience]
and is compensated accordingly.”159 When Congress enacted Section 111, copyright
holders could claim royalties only when cable system retransmitted local programming to
a “distant” audience.160 Royalties for local or national network programming are not
available for copyright holders under Section 111.161
Congress has repeatedly intended not to include retransmissions of content that
are already available and paid in the statutory licensing scheme. 162 For example, in 1995,
when Congress created a digital performance right in sound recordings it exempted
retransmissions of broadcast radio within one hundred and fifty miles of the original
broadcast.163 In 1999, in Section 122 for satellite retransmission, Congress exempted
royalties if the re-transmitters were offering the transmissions only to the local
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subscribers, in-market, “because the works have already been licensed, and paid for with
respect to viewers in those local markets.”164
Congress continually has stepped in between the cable industry and broadcasters
to regulate competition. Cable’s free reign over retransmission of local broadcaster
signals once again caused Congress to interfere and create the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the “Cable Act”), a cable-specific
statute. Congress passed the Cable Act because of a lack of competition in the cable
industry that caused the average monthly cable rates to skyrocket. 165 The Cable Act
ensured that competitors such as satellite and wireless cable delivery systems, had access
to popular cable programming that they had been denied in the past. 166 Further, the Cable
Act allowed local broadcast stations two options either to negotiate for retransmission
consent or to take guaranteed carriage under the “must carry” provision. Prior to this law,
cable systems used broadcast signals without station consent and resold the signals to
subscribers—making millions.167 Retransmission consent requires cable systems to
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obtain permission from broadcasters before carrying their programming. 168 Congress
enacted the Cable Act to prevent a competitive imbalance between the two industries and
required that broadcasters could either keep their must carry status or enter into
negotiations with cable operators.169 Eventually, the Cable Act became a subsidy for the
national broadcast networks.
Congress acknowledged that broadcasters’ interest in their signals and the
copyright holder’s interest in the programming contained on the signal were
distinguished and “[t]he principles that underlie the compulsory copyright license of
Section 111 . . . are undisturbed by this legislation.”170 The Cable Act was not “intended
to affect Federal copyright law.”171
The new license scheme should reflect the current video programming
marketplace and provide bright line rules for retransmission of digital signals.
Additionally, the new license should look to the intent of Section 111.
At its inception, Section 111 served its purpose and made it easier for cable to
clear programming rights carried on distant broadcast signals. Long ago, cable, as a
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nascent industry, needed the Section 111 subsidy to compete on even terms with
broadcasters. Today, cable no longer requires such a subsidy, but rather Internet TV finds
itself in a hostile marketplace because its existence threatens damage to the broadcast
industry.
For the proposed new licensing scheme, Congress should allow Internet TV
providers to retransmit local television signals on a royalty-free basis.

This would

provide local television broadcast to Internet TV users and promote competition between
Internet TV providers and broadcasters. This approach would work well for the proposed
licensing scheme because, “Congress has repeatedly determined that the retransmission
of local television stations by cable systems and satellite carriers does not harm copyright
owners where they are adequately compensated in their direct licensing agreements with
broadcasters.”172
The new license would update and harmonize existing statutory license by
allowing fees only for distant signal and not local transmissions. Because the effect of
local retransmissions is dubious and broadcasters are typically compensated through
advertising and not the recipients of the broadcast, a license eliminating fees for local
transmissions would not harm the broadcasters.
Financing of broadcast television is accomplished primarily through advertising
and retransmission fees.

Since Internet retransmission of broadcast content cannot

remove the accompanying advertisements and it presents the content unaltered, a
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broadcaster would not suffer because the intended audience would still be receiving the
advertisements.
The loss of retransmission fees from cable companies would harm broadcasters.
However, requiring broadcasters to swallow this cost in order to provide a public benefit
and secure innovation would be a worthwhile exchange. Without the ability to stream
content, the Internet TV industry will not be given the appropriate incentive to develop
further. Although cost-effective services like Aereo may induce users to leave their
traditional cable companies thereby resulting in a loss of retransmission fees for
broadcasters, this result does not justify preventing the public from receiving their desired
content because copyright holders denied retransmission permission. Allowing Internet
TV to retransmit broadcasters’ signals would greatly increase the flow of information.
Local news, community building, sports, and critical information during emergencies
would be more readily available for thirty million Americans that do not have access to
cable or satellite.173
A compulsory license would reduce the extent to which copyright ownership
would monopolize the creations and access of innovations in that industry. Mitigation of
monopolistic behavior is the strongest argument for adoption of the proposed compulsory
licensing scheme.174 A group of scholars asserts “[t]he general theory of a competitive
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free market economy shows that monopoly will reduce overall welfare by providing
distorted price signals to consumers, causing them to purchase the wrong combination of
goods and services to maximize their welfare.”175 A license would simply make the
information more readily available for others to stimulate the production of more
technology and innovation. The compelled licensing regime will reward the broadcasters
while enabling subsequent Internet TV developers to innovate the available signals
further without incurring deterrent costs or facing an entry barrier set by the copyright
holder’s inability to negotiate.
This license would commence for a temporary five-year term, allowing
reevaluation of the market in five years and allowing Congress time to test changes for
the video programming industry on a smaller scale, which in turn would effectuate a
successful rewrite of the Copyright Act. Such a license will cure the imbalance that has
resulted from the Aereo decision, which effectively decapitated any hope for future
innovations for Internet television.
2.

Long Term Solution: “Device-Shifting” Fair Use

This note also proposes that technological fair use should apply to Aereo and
other similar technologies under the concept of “device-shifting.” Technological fair use
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is a new sect of case law emerging from the fair use doctrine. 176 Technological fair use
deals with not only the legality of certain uses of copyrighted works but also, the legality
of emerging technologies that affect innovation and the U.S. economy.177
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. is the landmark case that
found time shifting to constitute as technological fair use. In Sony, movie studios sued to
block the sale of Sony’s Betamax videocassette recorder (VCR), they argued that Sony
was liable because its customers were making unauthorized copies.178 The Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that home time-shifting recordings were permissible fair
use and the VCR technology was legal because of its substantial non-infringing uses.179
Thirty years ago, in Sony, the Court “came within one vote of declaring VCR
Contraband” because the VCR technology had the directly threatened the television and
movie industries.180 If the Sony Court decided the other way, then billions of dollars in
revenue for the VCR, Video Rental, and Video Camera markets would never have been
realized.181 Broadcast Networks made similar calamitous predictions about Aereo and the
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Court supported that conclusion by stifling technological innovation in their Aereo
decision.182
A finding of fair use in Aereo would have created an innovative legal standard.
Fair use would have offered two things: (1) fair use would have obviated a compulsory
licensing need, which could benefit not only Aereo, but also other entities and cloud
technologies seeking to build similar programs; and (2) fair use would have provided
copyright holders more mediums to display their work. Consequently, Congress should
amend the Copyright Act to provide a bright-line technological device-shifting fair use
exception.
In Sony, the Court made some influential pronouncements about personal use
copying and the fair use doctrine that can be applied to the Aereo decision. Personal use
copying includes things such as making time-shifted copies of television programs to
watch them later or loading the music from a purchased CD onto one’s computer.183
Internet TV systems such as Aereo do nothing more than redirect or device-shift the
broadcaster signals from the cable box to an iPad, computer, or device of your choice that
has internet connection.

Currently, such device-shifting technologies are readily
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available in products such as Slingbox, TiVo and others that provide retransmission of
content across different devices.184
While the VCR allowed society to watch programming at a later time, deviceshifting technologies allow users to watch programming in different locations. Deviceshifting technologies allow its consumers to make productive uses. Now users can evade
the television box, and even geographic boundaries that restrict TV to the living room.
These devices provide access to already purchased content or content that is freely
available through over-the-air broadcasts, as in Sony.
Aereo shares similar functionality to the VCR and its successors like Slingbox.
However, similar to the VCR, Aereo and other cloud technologies will face comparable
challenges to legalize their inventions.

Aereo only provides access to over-the-air

broadcasts, which are public domain, but with the additional Internet streaming option.185
While more consumers recognize the benefits of device-shifting, judicial
decisions that threaten the future use of such technology are against the purpose and
traditional intent of copyright law. Allowing courts to interpret the law in favor of
broadcasters does nothing more than tip the balance towards broadcasters’ monopolistic
control under the copyright law. Thus, Congress should adopt a fair use legislative
remedy that eliminates the discrepancies in copyright law.
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Technological fair use legislation would allow innovators to further improve
technology, and the public would benefit with the innovations. Fair use should be applied
uniformly in the technological area given the complexity of many cases. The fair use
principles laid out in Sony require strengthening with Congress playing a more central
role in advancing content and technology.
In strengthening the fair use doctrine for technology, Congress should make a
definitive legislation that legalizes device-shifting fair use.

By providing such an

exception, Congress would promote a clear advancement of technology and limit the
scope of the copyright owner’s rights, in contrast to the tendency of current case law,
which has broadened the reach of copyright holders.
Congress should adopt device-shifting fair use for similar reasons that timeshifting fair use was deemed acceptable. Under the fair use analysis, the burden of
proving harm or an adverse effect on the market for the copyrighted work rests on the
complainant. The Sony Court, in justifying time-shifting fair use, stated that advertising
revenue would not be lost because advertisements would still appear on the recorded
tapes.186 Internet streaming of free over-the-air broadcast content adheres to the same
logic. Aereo was taking advantage of free public airwaves and this cannot constitute
copyright infringement absent a likelihood of harm. Even if courts are able to find some
potential harm, their ultimate decision should rest on an interpretation of the Copyright
Act, which encourages technological innovation not monopolies. Thus, a device-shifting
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exception would create a positive impact on the manufacturer, the public, as well as
advancements in technology.
Part V: Conclusion
The state of copyright law is insufficient and piecemeal judicial decisions are only
adding to the confusion. The law is failing to keep up with the advancing technologies.
These, technological advances are essential to our society. New technologies provide an
incentive for investment and innovation. Consequently, protection of this technology is
indispensable to protect the fruit of a copyright owner’s labors. However, overprotection
of technology is as harmful as under protecting it. It is critical that copyright law
adequately keep pace with technological developments and society.
The Aereo decision may have stirred the pot regarding the legality of Internet
streaming, but Congress should have the last word in the matter. Without statutory
intervention, the Aereo decision has threatened newer technology and sent many
technology providers searching for alternative loopholes to legally provide their muchneeded services.
Congress has two options to satiate the purpose of the Copyright Act, which
requires balancing the protection of copyrighted works against the incentive of creators to
advance technologies. Congress can either allow a compulsory license for Internet TV,
which would mitigate the monopolistic behavior of copyright holders and broadcasters.
This proposed license is consistent with the purpose of the copyright laws and prior uses
of compulsory licensing.

Alternatively, Congress can enact technological fair use

legislation that would allow technologies such as Aereo to develop more and allow
subscribers a better option for television consumption. It is time that Congress must

reconsider the existing laws in the face of growing technology and speed up the
inevitable television revolution.

